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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates whether ownership concentration and
different types of large shareholders can account for differences in corporate
profitability.  Both univariate tests and multivariate tests are applied on a sample
of German and UK initial public offerings (IPOs).  It is particularly interesting to
study German and UK IPOs for two reasons.  First, comparing German and UK
firms is beneficial in terms of a high cross-sectional variation of ownership, as
both countries have financial markets characterised by different levels of
ownership concentration.  Most previous studies have suffered from a low cross-
sectional variation.  Second, analysing IPOs over several years adds an
interesting time-series variation to the study.
The univariate study tests whether entrenchment by the initial large shareholder
and a higher exposure to the disciplining role of the market for corporate control
have any effects on a firm’s financial performance.  The multivariate study tests
a dynamic model which relates current performance to past performance and
ownership characteristics.  We do not find any link between profitability and
ownership and conclude that ownership is chosen in ways to maximise firm
value.
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1. Introduction
The question whether there is a link between ownership and control is not a new one.
Adam Smith (1776) refers to the problem which might arise from the separation of
control and ownership:
’It is in the interest of every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his
emoluments are to be precisely the same, whether he does, or does not perform some
laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly understood,
either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some authority which will not
suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless and slovenly a manner as that
authority will permit.’
The present paper performs a study of the financial performance of British and
German IPOs floated by families or individuals.  As Germany and the UK have
financial systems characterised by significantly different levels of ownership
concentration and different control structures, they provide a rich cross-sectional
variation.
It is particularly interesting to study IPOs for two major reasons.  First, the period
around the IPO is a period of potentially substantial changes of ownership.  Before the
flotation a firm’s ownership in general remains very stable: Goergen (1997b) shows
that 94-96 per cent of German firms are floated by their founding shareholders and
76-85 per cent of UK firms are floated by their founders.  Secondly, the period
following the IPO is when the ownership structure is established.  A firm’s ownership
seems to be established after about 5-6 years as the results in Goergen (1997b)
suggest.
Unlike previous studies, this one does not discriminate against small and medium-
sized firms.  Rather than selecting our sample from one of the annually published
ranking tables, as most previous studies did, our sample is formed by the German3
firms going public between 1981 and 1988.  The German IPOs are then matched with
UK IPOs.
Section 2 discusses previous empirical studies.  Section 3 develops the hypotheses
which will be tested and explains the two different methodologies used.  Section 4
describes the data and measures of performance we adopt.  Section 5 contains the
results from our study.  Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Results from previous empirical studies
This paper builds on the results by Goergen (1997b) which show that ownership by
the pre-IPO shareholders six years after the flotation can be explained by factors such
as the level of risk of the firm’s environment and the liquidity needs of the original
shareholders.  In other words, we consider ownership to be endogenous.
Several studies on firm value (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)), Wruck (1989)
and McConnell and Servaes (1990)) have detected a link between financial
performance and ownership.  However, as Loderer and Martin (1996) observe, the
relationship is weak and the studies do not agree on the regions of ownership that are
beneficial or detrimental to firm value.  These studies, given that they are mostly
based on large, widely held US companies, are characterised by a poor cross-sectional
variation of ownership.  Other studies that have analysed firms with a wider range of
ownership concentration (e.g. Slovin and Sushka (1993)) or have questioned the
direction of causality from ownership to performance (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
Kole (1996) and Loderer and Martin (1996)) have in general found no relationship at
all.
3. Does ownership matter?
This section will try to detect whether ownership matters in terms of resource
allocation.  Do different ownership structures and different levels of ownership4
concentration imply different levels of financial performance?  Two different types of
analysis are performed: a univariate analysis and a multivariate analysis.
3.1 Univariate analysis
We derive three conjectures from the following theoretical propositions:
- the Berle-Means (1932) thesis: widely held firms should perform
(significantly) worse than concentrated firms;
- the Leland and Pyle (1977) signalling theory: insiders by selling only a small
amount of the equity of their business concern in the IPO signal that they believe that
their firm will perform well in the future: by extending the Leland and Pyle
proposition from the IPO to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), this would imply that
the more concentrated firms should perform better than the widely dispersed firms;
- the entrenchment hypothesis (Fama and Jensen (1983)), which states that if a
manager has control over his firm, he might be tempted to adopt a non-profit
maximising approach, as he will not be exposed to the disciplining role of the market
for corporate control: the concentrated firms are expected to perform worse than the
loosely held firms.
First, we compare the financial performance of German firms remaining under family
control over the six-year period following the IPO with the financial performance of
UK firms that become widely held before the end of the same period.  The aim of this
first univariate test is to compare German firms that have the concentrated ownership
of the typical listed German firm with UK firms that have the dispersed ownership of
the typical listed UK firm.  In other words, this first test tries to determine whether the
typical German firm performs better / worse than the typical UK firm.
C1. As listed German and UK firms are characterised by very different patterns of
ownership, they should also be characterised by very different levels of
performance.5
Second, we compare German and UK firms that remain under family control with
widely held German and UK firms.
Essentially, this second test assumes along with the theory of ownership that firms
with a similar ownership should have similar levels of profitability, independent of the
fact that they may be incorporated and be operating in different countries.  More
precisely, this second test is a test of the entrenchment hypothesis.
C2. Firms whose ownership remains concentrated in the hands of the original
shareholders have a worse performance than firms whose owners sell out to
the market.
Finally, using an event study, we try to determine whether firms that experience a
substantial reduction in ownership concentration also experience substantial changes
of their financial performance.
C3. If ownership has an influence on financial performance, then substantial
reductions in ownership concentration should be followed by substantial
changes in the firm’s financial performance.
3.2 Multivariate analysis
The multivariate analysis acts as an additional test, i.e. a verification of the results
obtained from the previous analysis.  Given that the estimated model distinguishes
between share stakes held by the pre-IPO shareholders and stakes held by all other
shareholders, and is a dynamic model taking into account changes of ownership, the
multivariate analysis encompasses the three separate univariate tests described in the
previous section.
For the multivariate analysis we estimate an equation which relates financial
performance to past financial performance, past ownership by the pre-IPO
shareholders and past ownership of the firm by the post-IPO shareholders.6
Hence:
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where:
· Pi,t is a measure of the financial performance of firm i during year t;
· OLDi,t is a measure of the ownership held by the pre-IPO shareholders at the
end of year t;
· NEWi,t is a measure of the ownership held by the post-IPO shareholders.
We use three different measures of ownership by pre-IPO shareholders and by post-
IPO shareholders:
- the largest stake held by each category, Loldi,t and Lnewi,t respectively;
- the total proportion of voting shares owned by each group, Toldi,t and Tnewi,t
respectively;
- a Herfindahl index of the concentration of ownership in each category, Coldi,t
and Cnewi,t respectively.
· If the measure of ownership is the stake held by the largest old shareholder,
i.e. Loldi,t, and the largest new shareholder, i.e. Lnewi,t, the dummy variables
Typei,j,t are added to the model.  They indicate the type of largest shareholder
(i.e. the largest shareholder as such, independent of whether he is a pre-IPO
shareholder or a post-IPO shareholder) in firm i in period t where:
- Family stands for a family shareholder;
- Domestic for another firm from the same country;
- Foreign for a firm from another country;
- Bank for a bank and
- Investor for a non-bank institutional investor and7
- Charity for a charity.1
· the error term g i=h i+n i,t, where h i is the fixed-effects term and n i,t is
the inter-temporal error term.
A more general and simple model will also be estimated where ownership is
expressed as the proportion of voting shares that are widely held, Whi,t (obtained by
taking the difference between 100 per cent and the sum of all known stakes in the
firm).  In other words, Whi,t, Toldi,t and Tnewi,t add up to 100 per cent whereas
Loldi,t and Lnewi,t only refer to the largest shareholder in each category and do in
general not add up to 100 per cent.
Concerning the general specification of the model, we regress present financial
performance on past financial performance and past ownership.  Present performance
is regressed on past ownership rather than present ownership, as we believe that it
takes time for changes in ownership patterns to affect financial profitability.  After a
change of control, the new controlling shareholder needs time to understand how the
firm works and to devise and put in place new management strategies and procedures.
Finally, as we will see in section 5.1.2, Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) show that
imposing the restriction that profitability in t depends only on profitability in t-1, and
not also on the profitability of earlier periods (e.g. t-2, t-3), is a valid restriction for
German and UK firms.
All the dynamic panel data models were estimated using OLS as well as GMM
(Generalised Method of Moments) in differences (GMM(diff)) and GMM system
(GMM(sys)).  Dynamic OLS models provide biased and inconsistent estimates if
there are unobserved fixed effects as the error term will be correlated with the
                                                
1 In order to prevent perfect multicollinearity in the model, the penultimate type of shareholder dummy, Investor,
is omitted in the models estimated on the size-matched sample (there were no charities exercising the role of
largest shareholder) and the last type of shareholder dummy, Charity, is omitted from the industry-matched model.8
explanatory variables.  In this case the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable
will suffer from an upward bias.
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a procedure which consists in first-differencing the
model and then applying the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM(diff)), using
lagged levels of the dependent variable and the independent variables as instruments.
By taking first differences, the fixed error term h i is eliminated.  Given that the
shocks n i,t are not serially correlated, we can use the lagged levels dated t-2 and
earlier of the dependent variable and the independent variables as instruments to
obtain a consistent estimator.  The advantage of the Arellano and Bond technique over
other methods such as the widely used Anderson and Hsiao (1982) procedure is its
efficient use of available instruments.
Blundell and Bond (1995) have shown that GMM(diff) performs poorly, if the
autoregressive parameter is moderately large and the number of time series
observations is moderately small.  In other words if there are no fixed effects (or few
fixed effects), then the lagged levels of the series are weak instruments and
GMM(diff) provides a downward-biased estimate of b 1, the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable.
GMM(sys) uses a system of equations, i.e. the lagged differences of the dependent
variable and the independent variables as instruments for equations in levels as well as
lagged levels of the dependent variable and the independent variables for equations in
first differences.  Blundell and Bond (1995) show that, using Monte Carlo
simulations, GMM(sys) provides efficiency gains where GMM(diff) performs
poorly.2
                                                
2 All the models were estimated using the most recent version, the 1996 version of the Arellano and Bond (1988)
DPD programme written in GAUSS.9
4. Data description and measures of performance used
4.1 The data
The sample of German IPOs used in this paper is identical to the sample used in
Goergen (1997b).  Our period of study covers 1981 to 1988.  During that period there
was a total of 98 IPOs on the official and secondary markets in Germany.  We have
consistent and reliable ownership data for 86 of these IPOs.  We focus on the 62 firms
(out of the 86 firms) floated by families or individuals.
Given that during 1981 to 1988, there was a total of 764 UK IPOs on the official
market and on the USM, not all UK IPOs could be taken into consideration in this
study.  The 62 German IPOs were therefore matched with UK IPOs of the same
market capitalisation (adjusted for inflation) to obtain a first sample and were also
matched by industry to obtain a second sample.
Accounting data were obtained from the IPO prospectuses, company reports, Extel
Financial Company Research CD-roms as well as from Datastream and the EXTEL
microfiches for the UK.  Share price data were taken from the Karlsruher
Kapitalmarktdatenbank (KKMD) for Germany and from the London Share Price
Database ((LSPD) for the UK.  If the firms published consolidated accounting figures
from the year of the IPO the consolidated figures were used rather than the
unconsolidated figures.
4.2 Measures of performance
We use three different measures of financial performance.  The first two measures use
accounting data.  Although German accounting data have often been accused of being
meaningless, Harris, Lang and M￿ller (1994) find that there is a similar relationship
between 18-month stock returns and annual earnings for German firms as there is for
US firms between 1982 and 1991.10
The first measure is entirely based on accounting figures.  It is the annual cash flow
defined as the published profit gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in
provisions divided by the sum of equity and debt of the firm.
The second measure is the same cash flow figure but divided by the market value of
equity and the book value of debt.  This measure is similar to the measure used by
Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992).  Compared to our first measure of return, the
advantage of this second measure is that given that it is not based on the book value of
assets it excludes the effects of different policies of depreciation, of interest charges
and interest receivable and taxes.  Therefore, this measure does not depend on the
capital structure of the firm.
As some German firms have two classes of shares, with only one of them listed on the
stock exchange (normally the non-voting preference shares), we used the stock price
of the quoted class of property rights as an estimation of the value of the unquoted
class.  We are aware that this might introduce a downward bias in the calculated rate
of return for the German companies.3
As German accounting is not subject to standards as rigorous as those in the UK, it
was not possible to calculate ratios such as a profit margin defined by operating profit
over sales.  The sales figure can indeed include VAT and council taxes for some
firms.  Furthermore, some firms change the definition of sales figure over years.  Also
the sales figure is sometimes net of sales costs and in these cases sales costs are not
separately stated elsewhere in the company report.
We therefore reasoned that it would be wise to use a third measure of performance
which would not be based on accounting data.  The third measure is the annual
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated from the end of month share prices.
                                                
3 This rough estimation is still better than using the book value for the unlisted class.  Indeed, using the book value
would double the value of the ratio for firms such as Henkel KGaA.11
The CARs were calculated by using the market model with b=1 and a=0.  For each
country two different stock market indices were used in order to check the robustness
of the results to different approximations of the market portfolio.  For Germany we
alternatively used the DAX Index (Deutscher Aktienindex) and the FAZ Index
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Index) whereas for the UK we used both the FT-SE
100 Index and the FT-All Share Index.
For the German IPOs the two latter measures of performance might be subject to a
difference in valuation due to takeover legislation.  In Germany it is possible to take
control over a listed concern without having to make an offer for the entire equity.
Changes of control of firms with a concentrated ownership are normally arranged off
the stock market by transferring the existing controlling stake to the new shareholder,
without involving the minority shareholders.  As a consequence, the market price does
not include the same takeover premium as it does in the UK.
5. Discussion of the results
5.1 Results from the univariate analysis
We first discuss the results from the univariate analysis.  The discussion of the results
is organised in three parts corresponding to the three conjectures established in section
3.1.  Second, we discuss the findings from the multivariate test.  Finally, given the
results from the second test, we perform an additional test.
5.1.1 Results from the univariate analysis
5.1.1.1 Comparison of the financial performance of concentrated German firms and
widely held UK firms
This section tests the validity of conjecture one, i.e. it compares the German firms that
remain under family control over the seven years following the IPO with the UK firms
that become widely held.  The aim of this first univariate test is to detect whether the12
two systems of capital markets, which are characterised by contrasting ownership
structures, are also characterised by different levels of financial performance.
We consider that a firm becomes widely held if none of its shareholders holds more
than 25 per cent of the voting shares after a certain time and until the end of the period
of study at least.  We are aware that this threshold is arbitrary in the case of the UK,
but using a threshold has the advantage of being clear-cut and avoids dealing with
more ambiguous definitions that are subject to difficulties of interpretation.  Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1988) findings somehow justify our choice as they show that
shareholdings of at least 25 per cent are controlling shareholdings.  Firms that become
widely held, but are eventually taken over are excluded from this first test.
25 UK firms are widely held according to the above definition.  Nine of these firms
already had a dispersed ownership immediately after the flotation.  The remaining 16
firms became widely held immediately after the IPO or gradually during the
subsequent years.
We define a firm as remaining under family control, if the initial family shareholder
has the largest stake in the firm over the period of study, given that his stake exceeds
at least 25 per cent of the voting equity at any time.
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics for the first measure of financial
performance, the ratio of cash flow defined as the published profit gross of
depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions over the book values of debt
and equity.  Panel B and panel C of table 1 shows that for this first measure of
financial return the difference in performance between German and UK IPOs is not
statistically different from zero at any reasonable level of confidence.  This is both
true for each of the individual years and for the whole period.13
Table 2 displays the values and the descriptive statistics for the second measure of
performance, the ratio of the cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and
changes in provisions over the market value of equity and the book value of debt.
Again, there is no significant difference between the performance of the two samples
both for of the individual years and for the entire period of study.
Table 1: Performance of German firms remaining under family control and
UK firms that become widely held using the ratio of cash flow to book values of
equity and debt as a performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the
book values of equity and debt.  (2) The German firms are all the firms that remained under the control of their initial family
shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder of the firm, holding at
least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The UK firms are all the firms that were or became widely held during the period and
then remained widely held at least until the end of the period.  A firm is defined as being widely held, if none of its
shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Germany
Mean 20.3 19.3 18.8 17.8 16.5 15.0 16.1 17.0
Median 18.4 18.7 18.1 16.5 16.0 15.2 17.1 15.8
Mini-
mum
9.5 3.1 -6.1 5.1 3.6 -20.3 -24.3 -11.8
Maxi-
mum
53.5 39.5 40.2 40.2 44.1 38.5 36.9 39.1
Sample
size
27 31 33 35 36 34 25 36
UK
Mean 22.7 18.1 19.4 15.2 15.1 10.8 11.9 15.8
Median 23.0 18.0 18.5 17.1 15.8 14.2 14.4 15.5
Mini-
mum
11.1 -26.5 3.6 -7.1 -69.6 -51.9 -29.4 -3.6
Maxi-
mum
39.6 48.4 41.2 30.5 101.6 27.4 26.9 26.6
Sample
size
13 25 26 25 23 21 21 26
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
-0.800 0.386 -0.278 1.102 0.293 1.121 1.097 0.595
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.161 0.933 0.827 0.713 0.855 0.564 0.175 0.440
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial and LSE
microfiches.14
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics for the third performance index, the annual
cumulative abnormal returns.  There is some evidence that German firms that remain
family-controlled perform better two years (at the one per cent level of confidence for
the two-tailed parametric and non-parametric tests) after the flotation.  However, in
year five UK firms tend to perform better (at the five per cent level for the t-test and at
the ten per cent level for the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test).  If one looks at the
aggregate data (last column of table 3), there is no evidence that either the German
IPOs or the UK IPOs perform consistently better.
Table 2: Performance of German firms remaining under family control and
UK firms that become widely held using the ratio of cash flow to market value
of equity and book value of debt as a performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the
market value of equity and the book value of debt.  (2) The German firms are all the firms that remained under the control of
their initial family shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder of
the firm, holding at least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The UK firms are all the firms that were or became widely held
during the period and then remained widely held at least until the end of the period.  A firm is defined as being widely held, if
none of its shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Germany
Mean 11.3 11.1 11.2 10.8 10.3 9.8 11.1 10.5
Median 11.2 9.8 11.8 9.7 9.7 11.4 10.4 10.8
Mini-
mum
4.3 2.0 -4.6 1.8 3.0 -19.2 -20.2 -10.9
Maxi-
mum
23.1 20.9 24.1 25.5 20.6 28.7 32.1 23.7
Sample
size
27 31 33 35 36 34 25 36
UK
Mean 11.6 9.6 13.2 10.0 8.9 7.2 7.5 9.7
Median 11.7 11.8 13.1 10.6 11.6 9.3 8.8 10.7
Mini-
mum
4.2 -17.7 3.0 -6.2 -52.8 -29.8 -23.8 -3.6
Maxi-
mum
15.8 19.7 22.7 22.3 66.8 27.0 18.7 17.5
Sample
size
13 25 26 25 23 21 21 26
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
-0.166 0.952 -1.372 0.508 0.392 1.037 1.270 0.649
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.479 0.735 0.169 0.927 0.489 0.211 0.205 0.484
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.15
Furthermore, different stock indices such as the DAX Index and the FT-SE 100 Index
and different pairings of German and UK indices used for the calculation of the
cumulative abnormal returns do not produce different results.
Again one cannot reject the null hypothesis of an identical performance for both
samples over the whole period of analysis.
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that there may be a possible time trend in the average
performance of widely held UK firms.  The first performance measure (table 1), the
Table 3: Performance of German firms remaining under family control and
UK firms that become widely held using the cumulative abnormal returns as a
performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is the cumulative abnormal return.  The cumulative abnormal returns were obtained by using
a market model with parameter values of b =1 and a =0.  The market indices used are the FAZ Index for Germany and the
FT-All Share Index for the UK.  (2) The German firms are all the firms that remained under the control of their initial family
shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder of the firm, holding at
least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The UK firms are all the firms that were or became widely held during the period and
then remained widely held at least until the end of the period.  A firm is defined as being widely held, if none of its
shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.  (3) * Significant at the one per cent level for the two-tailed test.
** Significant at the five per cent level for the two-tailed test.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Germany
Mean 6.4 -2.0 15.1 -2.4 -10.8 -10.7 -1.8 -6.2
Median 3.7 -2.8 11.3 -4.4 -5.8 -7.8 9.5 -6.7
Mini-
mum
-71.5 -79.3 -28.7 -59.3 -125.4 -110.3 -272.9 -382.1
Maxi-
mum
99.5 98.0 85.9 82.7 41.9 106.4 99.1 265.5
Sample
size
37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
UK
Mean 1.1 -15.2 -14.1 -17.6 2.7 14.1 -10.1 -39.3
Median 0.2 -10.0 -17.3 -19.5 -1.8 5.0 -5.9 -25.4
Mini-
mum
-70.0 -135.9 -101.3 -134.6 -76.9 -109.4 -93.8 -246.0
Maxi-
mum
87.3 88.0 153.0 83.4 88.8 175.9 62.8 128.2
Sample
size
29 29 29 29 28 26 25 29
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
0.645 1.284 2.995* 1.574 -1.484 -1.993** 0.605 1.315
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.684 0.304 0.001 0.146 0.277 0.091 0.162 0.212
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.16
ratio of the cash flow to book values of equity and debt, drops gradually from 23 to 12
per cent.  For the second measure of performance (table 2), a time trend also seems to
be present, but is less pronounced.  There is no time trend in the profitability of the
German firms in either case.  There is no time trend, neither for the German firms nor
the UK firms, if financial performance is measured by the cumulative abnormal return
(table 3).
Given that by definition some of the UK firms start off being concentrated and
become widely held after a few years only, and that all the UK firms necessarily have
a dispersed ownership in year six, one could argue that if the Berle-Means (1932)
thesis is true, as more and more firms get loosely held, the lower the average
profitability should fall.
However, by analysing the underlying performance data, we can say that the time
trend is caused by the firm with the lowest performance in each year (the firms whose
performance is listed under minimum).  If these firms are dropped, the time trend
disappears.  Furthermore, by analysing the ownership of these firms, we could not
detect a common ownership issue (e.g. a substantial drop in ownership concentration).
To summarise, our results are not consistent with conjecture one.  The German and
UK capital markets, which are characterised by different patterns of ownership, are
not characterised by different levels of financial performance.
5.1.1.2 Comparison of the financial performance of concentrated firms and widely
held firms
In this section, we compare the performance of concentrated companies with widely
held companies, i.e. we investigate whether conjecture two is valid.  The difference
with the previous section is that here we compare all concentrated firms - whether
German or UK firms - with all dispersed firms.17
Our concentrated firms are all the firms that remain under family control as defined in
the previous section.  We also use the same definition for the widely held firms as the
one used in the previous section.  Although a number of UK firms fall under the
former category, none of the German firms falls under the latter.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the results for this second univariate test.  Table 4 shows that
if we adopt the ratio of cash flow to the sum of the book values of debt and equity as a
measure of financial profitability, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between the performance of concentrated firms and loosely held firms.
This is true for each individual year, for the total period of analysis, and is also true
whatever type of statistical test we use.18
If we use the ratio of cash flow to the sum of the market value of equity and the book
value of equity (table 5), we arrive at the same conclusion: the performance of
German and UK firms remaining under family control is not significantly different
from the performance of firms experiencing a separation of ownership and control.
Table 4: Performance of all the firms remaining under family control and all
the firms that become widely held using the ratio of cash flow to book values of
equity and debt as a performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the
book values of equity and debt.  (2) The firms in panel A are all the German and UK firms that remained under the control of
their initial family shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder of
the firm, holding at least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The firms in panel B are all the German and UK firms that were or
became widely held during the period and then remained widely held at least until the end of the period.  A firm is defined as
being widely held, if none of its shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Firms with no change of control
Mean 21.5 19.8 17.9 16.9 15.2 14.7 13.7 16.4
Median 19.4 19.0 17.9 16.5 14.7 15.7 16.8 16.3
Mini-
mum
3.6 1.5 -12.3 -14.1 -9.3 -28.8 -24.3 -11.8
Maxi-
mum
53.5 44.5 40.2 43.2 44.1 38.5 36.9 39.1
Sample
size
47 54 58 61 61 58 49 62
Firms experiencing a separation of ownership and control
Mean 22.7 18.1 19.4 15.2 15.1 10.8 11.9 15.8
Median 23.0 18.0 18.5 17.1 15.8 14.2 14.4 15.5
Mini-
mum
11.1 -26.5 3.6 -7.1 -69.6 -51.9 -29.4 -3.6
Maxi-
mum
39.6 48.4 41.2 30.5 101.6 27.4 26.9 26.6
Sample
size
13 25 26 25 23 21 21 26
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
-0.400 0.652 -0.678 0.705 0.048 1.178 0.524 0.320
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.435 0.866 0.663 0.920 0.655 0.602 0.408 0.641
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial and LSE
microfiches.19
Finally, if the cumulative abnormal returns are used to evaluate the profitability of the
two samples (table 6), there is some weak evidence for year two and year three after
the flotation at the ten per cent level of confidence that companies with a widespread
shareholder structure perform worse than companies that are still closely held.
However, there is no evidence that firms with no change of control perform
significantly better / worse than dispersed firms over the whole period using either
type of statistical test.
Table 5: Performance of all the firms remaining under family control and all
the firms that become widely held using the ratio of cash flow to market value
of equity and book value of debt as a performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the
market value of equity and the book value of debt.  (2) The firms in panel A are all the German and UK firms that remained
under the control of their initial family shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the
largest shareholder of the firm, holding at least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The firms in panel B are all the German and
UK firms that were or became widely held during the period and then remained widely held at least until the end of the
period.  A firm is defined as being widely held, if none of its shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Firms with no change of control
Mean 11.2 11.0 11.3 10.8 9.8 9.0 8.6 10.1
Median 11.2 10.4 11.4 10.9 9.7 9.7 9.5 11.1
Mini-
mum
3.2 3.0 -4.6 -2.9 -11.4 -50.6 -20.2 -10.9
Maxi-
mum
23.1 20.9 24.1 25.5 21.4 28.7 32.1 23.7
Sample
size
47 54 57 59 60 57 49 59
Firms experiencing a separation of ownership and control
Mean 11.6 9.6 13.2 10.0 8.9 7.2 7.5 9.7
Median 11.7 11.8 13.1 10.6 11.6 9.3 8.8 10.7
Mini-
mum
4.2 -17.7 3.0 -6.2 -52.8 -29.8 -23.8 -3.6
Maxi-
mum
15.8 19.7 22.7 22.3 66.8 27.0 18.7 17.5
Sample
size
13 25 26 25 23 21 21 26
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
-0.289 1.066 -1.418 0.563 0.289 0.653 0.442 0.367
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.499 0.768 0.166 0.934 0.393 0.524 0.620 0.800
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.20
Our findings therefore do not confirm conjecture two, stating that firms that do not
experience a change of control after the flotation suffer from management
entrenchment and should have a financial profitability which is lower than the one of
firms that become exposed to the disciplining role of the market for corporate control.
Table 6: Performance of all the firms remaining under family control and all
the firms that become widely held using the cumulative abnormal returns as a
performance measure
(1) The measure of performance is the cumulative abnormal return.  The cumulative abnormal returns were obtained by using
a market model with parameter values of b =1 and a =0.  The market indices used are the FAZ Index for Germany and the
FT-All Share Index for the UK.  (2) The firms in panel A are all the German and UK firms that remained under the control of
their initial family shareholder over the whole period.  The controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder of
the firm, holding at least 25 per cent of the voting equity.  The firms in panel B are all the German and UK firms that were or
became widely held during the period and then remained widely held at least until the end of the period.  A firm is defined as
being widely held, if none of its shareholders owns more than 25 per cent of its voting equity.  (3) * Significant at the one per
cent level for the two-tailed test.   ** Significant at the five per cent level for the two-tailed test.  *** Significant at the ten per
cent level for the two-tailed test.
Panel A: Mean, median, minimum, maximum and sample size
IPO IPO+1 IPO+2 IPO+3 IPO+4 IPO+5 IPO+6 Total
period
Firms with no change of control
Mean 5.2 -9.3 2.8 0.5 -4.8 2.2 -6.6 -9.7
Median 0.7 -8.9 3.9 -1.4 -3.0 1.4 0.0 -15.7
Mini-
mum
-74.4 -94.1 -103.3 -87.9 -125.4 -110.3 -272.9 -397.5
Maxi-
mum
124.4 98.0 93.8 89.2 216.4 117.7 99.1 330.4
Sample
size
66 66 66 65 65 65 63 66
Firms experiencing a separation of ownership and control
Mean 1.1 -15.2 -14.1 -17.6 2.7 14.1 -10.1 -39.3
Median 0.2 -10.0 -17.3 -19.5 -1.8 5.0 -5.9 -25.4
Mini-
mum
-70.0 -135.9 -101.3 -134.6 -76.9 -109.4 -93.8 -246.0
Maxi-
mum
87.3 88.0 153.0 83.4 88.8 175.9 62.8 128.2
Sample
size
29 29 29 29 28 26 25 29
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means
0.478 0.646 1.810*** 2.020** -0.676 -1.035 0.304 1.123
Panel C: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney p-value
0.880 0.753 0.033 0.077 0.309 0.418 0.488 0.316
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.21
5.1.1.3 Substantial reductions in ownership concentration: comparing the
performance prior to the change with the performance after the change
We define firms with a substantial reduction in ownership concentration as firms that
have one shareholder holding at least 50 per cent of the voting equity immediately
before the IPO (maybe also during subsequent years) and where the largest stake,
owned by any shareholder, drops below 25 per cent after a certain time.  These are the
firms that should experience a separation of ownership and control.  In other words,
these are the firms that were highly concentrated before the flotation and end up being
highly exposed to takeovers.  Nine UK firms are in this category, but no German firm
had a substantial reduction in ownership concentration.  Two of these firms were
eventually taken over.  Performance data are omitted from the year of the takeover for
these firms (for one of the two firms performance data were available after the
takeover, as the takeover was not a full takeover).4  We define the year of the
substantial change as the first year where the highest stake in the firm has decreased
below the 25 per cent of the total voting capital.
Basically, this section is a test of the validity of conjecture three, which states that
substantial reductions in ownership concentration should be followed by substantial
changes in profitability.
Table 7 reports both the performance before the substantial change and the
performance after the change.  As the change occurs in a different year relative to the
IPO for the different firms, the length of the period before and after the change may
vary for each firm.
                                                
4 Data on UK firms that are fully taken over are generally not available after the takeover.22
Both the results from the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in table 7 suggest
that using any of the three measures of profitability, the average financial performance
before the substantial reduction in ownership concentration is not significantly
different from the average performance after the reduction.  We therefore have to
reject conjecture three.
5.1.1.4 Univariate analysis: conclusion
Summarising the results obtained from the univariate analysis, we can say that there is
no evidence that there is a link between current performance and past ownership.
Neither do German firms with the typical ownership of German quoted firms perform
differently from UK firms with the typical ownership of UK quoted firms, nor can we
accept the entrenchment thesis.  Finally, our event study shows that firms with major
changes of their ownership, do not experience major changes in their financial
profitability.
Table 7: Firms with a substantial reduction in ownership concentration.  Tests
of significance for the difference in means between pre-change performance
and post-change performance
(1) We define firms with a substantial reduction in ownership concentration as firms that have one shareholder holding at
least 50 per cent of the voting equity immediately before the IPO and where the largest stake, owned by any shareholder,
drops below 25 per cent after a certain time.  Firms can be subsequently taken over, but performance data from the year of
the takeover are omitted.  Nine UK firms experienced a substantial change of ownership.  (2) CF1 is the average of the
annual cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the book values of debt and
equity.  CF2 is the average of the same cash flow, but divided by the market value of equity and the book value of debt.  CAR
is the average annual cumulative abnormal return.  The cumulative abnormal returns were obtained by using a market model
with parameter values of b =1 and a =0 .  The market indices used are the FAZ Index for Germany and the FT-All Share











CF1 13.4 11.2 0.193 11 -10
CF2 7.5 10.5 -0.473 6 -13
CAR -2.7 -29.2 1.251 28 -8
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.23
5.1.2 Results from the multivariate analysis
The aim of the present section is to perform further and more sophisticated tests,
based on dynamic panel data, to detect whether present performance is a function of
past performance and ownership.
By running an AR(1) process separately for each of the three estimation techniques,
OLS, GMM(diff) and GMM(sys), we found that the coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable generally exceeds 0.6.  The value for the coefficient is highest
under OLS, but there is no major difference between the values provided by
GMM(diff) and GMM(sys).  The results reported here are the estimates obtained from
OLS and from GMM(sys).
Also, each model was estimated separately for each of the three different measures of
profitability.  The results were slightly more significant for the first measure of
performance, the ratio of cash flow to book values of equity and debt, although the
conclusions did not differ widely from model to model.  We only report the estimation
results for the first measure of performance here.
Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 are all organised in the same way.  Columns (1) and (2) contain
the results from the OLS estimation using the sample matched by size and the sample
matched by industry respectively.  Columns (3) and (4) report the estimates from the
GMM(sys) estimation for the size-matched sample and the industry-matched sample
respectively.  The instruments were determined by the Sargan test.  The Sargan test is
a test of over-identifying restrictions.  It is asymptotically distributed as a c2(k), with
k degrees off freedom,  under the null hypothesis of valid instruments.
The OLS and GMM(sys) models are estimated using a differential intercept
COUNTRY - which is set to one, if firm i is German and set to zero otherwise - and24
differential slope coefficients - marked by a capital letter D - which measure the
differential effect of the variables for the German firms.5
All models include four industry dummies (see Goergen (1997b) for a discussion of
the four industrial groups) and six time dummies.  The time dummies refer to the year
of the IPO, e.g. one year after the IPO, two years after the IPO, etc.  The models were
also estimated in an alternative way, with time dummies referring to the actual
calendar year: 1982, 1983, etc., the rationale being that the historic calendar years take
into account the changing state of the economy as a whole.  This did not influence the
results.  Likewise, the models were also rerun using 21 industry dummies instead of
four only.  Again, the results were not affected in any significant way.
A first look at all four tables shows that the value of the coefficient on the lagged
financial performance ranges from 0.55 to 0.75 for the size-matched sample and from
0.42 to 0.54 for the industry-matched sample with an average value of 0.62 and 0.47
respectively.  A recent study on the sensitivity of corporate profitability to aggregate
demand shocks by Machin and Van Reenen (1993) uses the ratio of trading profits -
gross of interest and depreciation - to sales as the measure of profitability.  The
sample consists of 709 large UK listed firms over the period 1975 to 1986.  The
estimation technique used is GMM(diff).  Although their measure of performance is
different from ours, they find that profit in period t-1 explains between 0.438 and
0.480 of profit in period t.
Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) analyse the profitability persistence of large European
firms.  Using the Within Groups OLS (WGOLS) technique, they estimate the
                                                
5 Given that fixed effects are eliminated by taking first differences in the case of GMM(diff), the models estimated
with GMM(diff) do not include an intercept or differential intercept.25
following model for 51 UK firms over the period 1949 to 1977 and for 28 German
firms over the period 1961 to 1981:6
pt pt pt vt () * ( ) * ( ) . . . () = + -+ -+ + ll l 01 2 12 .
They find that the restriction l 2=l 3=0 is accepted for 82 per cent of the UK firms
and 79 per cent of the German firms.  The values they find for l 1 are 0.488 for the
UK and 0.410 for Germany, and 0.520 and 0.461 respectively if the results are
’corrected’ for small sample bias using the Johnston (1972) procedure.  Although their
results are not substantially different from ours, the reader should keep in mind that
these results might be suffering from a downward bias due to the use of the WGOLS
estimation procedure.
To summarise, our findings on the persistence of performance are similar to the
findings obtained by previous studies.
Table 8 reports the results for the least sophisticated model, that containing the
proportion of dispersed shares in each year t, with no distinction between shares
owned by pre-IPO shareholders and post-IPO shareholders.  The results from the
estimation using the size-matched sample (columns (1) and (3)) might suggest that
widely held UK firms have a better performance than concentrated UK firms.
However, the coefficient on Wh for the sample matched by industry is not
significantly different from zero and also has the opposite sign.
There is no evidence that widely held UK firms perform better than all the German
firms.  For example, the average values for the ratio of cash flow over book values of
equity and debt for the size-matched sample for Germany and the UK are 17.7 and
15.8 per cent respectively (table 1 of Goergen (1997b)).  The average over the period
for the proportion of widely held shares for Germany and the UK are 24.7 and 38.7
                                                
6 The reader should refer to Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) for more details on the parameters l 0, l 1 and l 2.26
per cent respectively (see column 3 of table 4.4 in Goergen (1997a)).  Inserting these
average values in the estimated model (1), we obtain a predicted performance of 18.6
per cent for Germany and 16.3 per cent for the UK.
The sign of the differential slope coefficient on Wh_D might suggest that there is a
weak inverse effect for Germany.  However, by running the model separately for each
country no relation between performance and ownership could be found for the
German firms.27
Table 9 contains the results for the model which explains performance by lagged
performance, the lagged largest stake held by the pre-IPO shareholders, Loldi,t, and
the lagged largest stake held by the post-IPO shareholders, Lnewi,t.  The coefficients
on the dummy variables indicating the type of the largest shareholder are not
significantly different from zero, except for model (2).  The OLS estimates from the
sample matched by market capitalisation (column (1)) suggest vaguely that the less
Table 8: Performance model with the pure accounting rate of return and
proportion of widely held voting shares
(a) CF1i,t  is the dependent variable in each model.  It is the cash flow adjusted for depreciation, interest, taxes and changes
in provisions divided by the book values of equity and debt.  Country is the differential intercept, Country being set to one if
firm i is German.  Whi,t is the percentage of the voting equity that is widely dispersed.  Variable names marked with a D are
the differential slope coefficients for German  firms.  (b) Models (1) and (3) are estimated using the size-matched sample.
Models (2) and (4) are estimated using the industry-matched sample.  (c) Each model contains time dummies and industry
dummies.  (d) m1 and m2 are test for the absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals respectively.
These test statistics are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  (e) The Sargan test
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c 2(k) under the null of valid instruments,
with k degrees of freedom reported in parentheses.   (f) Models(3) and (4) are linear systems of first-differenced and levels
equations.  The instruments are levels of CF1, CF1_D, Wh and Wh_D dated t-2 to t-3 for the differenced equations and first
differences dated t-1 for the levels equations.  (g) P-values, based on standard-errors asymptotically robust to
heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
OLS in levels GMM(sys)

















































m1 -0.500 0.399 -4.193 -3.511
m2 0.861 -0.260 1.009 -0.499
Sargan test (d.f.) - - 38 (39) 34 (39)
Observations 343 403 265 31128
concentrated a UK firm is (i.e. the smaller the largest stake held by the pre-IPO
shareholders and the smaller the largest stake held by the post-IPO shareholders) the
better will be its performance in the following period.  There appears to be no effect
for German firms.  However, the estimated slope coefficients obtained by running the
models under GMM(sys) for either sample or running the model under OLS for the
industry-matched sample are not significantly different from zero.  Furthermore,
neither the signs nor the magnitude of the coefficients on the different ownership
variables are stable from model to model and within the same sample.
Table 10 reports the estimation results for the total proportion of voting shares held by
the old shareholders and the new shareholders respectively.  By definition, subtracting
Told and Tnew from one gives the value for Wh, the total proportion of widely held
shares (table 8).  The results are not very conclusive, as the signs and magnitudes of
the coefficients on the ownership variables change from model to model (see e.g.
Told).  Looking back at the two previous tables, the impression here is that it is a
spurious phenomenon rather than a real relation between profitability and ownership
concentration.
Table 11 displays the results for the models containing the Herfindahl ownership
concentration indices.  Apart from the differential slope coefficient on the variable
Cold in model (1) (just significant at the five per cent level) none of the slope
coefficients relating to ownership is significantly different from zero.  Again, there is
no consistency in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the ownership
measures, even for a same sample (see e.g. the values for the coefficient on Cold
columns (1) and (3))
Given that a large part of the shareholders’ equity of some German firms comprises
non-voting shares and that our measures of ownership do only refer to ownership of
ordinary shares, i.e. voting shares, all the models were rerun including a temporal
dummy variable, which was set to one if firm i had non-voting preference shares29
listed in period t.  Essentially, the result was that the differential slope coefficient on
the ownership variable for the German firms was still of a different sign than the
general slope coefficient on the associated ownership variable, but that the absolute
values of both coefficients were even closer than before.
We also ran all the models using a quadratic form for ownership similar to the one
used by McConnell and Servaes (1990).  The result was that either the conclusions did
not change substantially (e.g. for the models with the largest stakes held by both
categories of shareholders) or the coefficients were not significantly different from
zero any more (e.g. for the model with Wh).
Summarising the results from tables 8, 9, 10 and 11, we can conclude that there does
not seem to be any strong evidence that current profitability depends on past
ownership.  Although some of the coefficients on the ownership variables were
significantly different from zero at the ten per cent level, the significance, the signs as
well as the magnitude of the coefficients were not stable from model to model.  Our
findings are so far similar to those by Loderer and Martin (1996) who also detected
’faint traces’ of a link between performance and ownership.
Furthermore, from the total of 48 models that were estimated, in only 17 models at
least one of the ownership coefficients was significantly different from zero at the ten
per cent level of confidence.  If we adopt the stricter level of confidence of five per
cent, in only nine models there was a significant ownership coefficient.  The large
majority of our results does therefore not provide any support for a relation between
present performance and past ownership.30
Table 9: Performance model with the pure accounting rate of return and
largest pre-IPO shareholder and largest post-IPO shareholder
(a) CF1i,t  is the dependent variable in each model.  It is the cash flow adjusted for depreciation, interest, taxes and changes
in provisions divided by the book values of equity and debt.  Country is the differential intercept, Country being set to one if
firm i is German.  Loldi,t and Lnewi,t are the percentage of the voting equity held by the largest pre-IPO shareholder and the
largest post-IPO shareholder respectively.  Variable names marked with a D are the differential slope coefficients for
German  firms.  (b) Models (1) and (3) are estimated using the size-matched sample.  Models (2) and (4) are estimated using
the industry-matched sample.  (c) Each model contains time dummies and industry dummies.  (d) m1 and m2 are test for the
absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals respectively.  These test statistics are asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  (e) The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over-identifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c 2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in
parentheses.   (f) Models (3) and (4) are linear systems of first-differenced and levels equations.  The instruments are levels of
CF1, CF1_D, Lold, Lold_D, Lnew and Lnew_D dated t-2  / t-2 to t-3 for the differenced equations and first differences dated
t-1 for the levels equations.  (g) P-values, based on standard-errors asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported
in parentheses.
OLS in levels GMM(sys)





































































































m1 -0.647 0.399 -4.647 -2.992
m2 0.891 -0.226 1.366 -0.272
Sargan test (d.f.) - - 38 (37) 52 (54)
Observations 341 403 264 31131
Table 10: Performance model with the pure accounting rate of return and
stakes held by all pre-IPO shareholders and post-IPO shareholders
(a) CF1i,t  is the dependent variable in each model.  It is the cash flow adjusted for depreciation, interest, taxes and changes
in provisions divided by the book values of equity and debt.  Country is the differential intercept, Country being set to one if
firm i is German.  Toldi,t and Tnewi,t are the total percentage of the voting equity held by the pre-IPO shareholders and the
post-IPO shareholders respectively.  Variable names marked with a D are the differential slope coefficients for German
firms.  (b) Models (1) and (3) are estimated using the size-matched sample.  Models (2) and (4) are estimated using the
industry-matched sample.  (c) Each model contains time dummies and industry dummies.  (d) m1 and m2 are test for the
absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals respectively.  These test statistics are asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  (e) The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over-identifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c 2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in
parentheses.   (f) Models(3) and (4) are linear systems of first-differenced and levels equations.  The instruments are levels of
CF1, CF1_D, Told, Told_D, Tnew and Tnew_D dated t-2 to t-4 / t-3  for the differenced equations and first differences dated
t-1 for the levels equations.  (g) P-values, based on standard-errors asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported
in parentheses.
OLS in levels GMM(sys)

































































m1 -0.533 0.409 -4.298 -3.772
m2 0.808 -0.266 1.130 -0.455
Sargan test (d.f.) - - 58 (71) 49 (59)
Observations 343 403 265 31132
In order to be more sure that there is no link between financial performance and
ownership concentration - link which might not have been picked up by our models -
we will perform two further tests in the next section.  These tests are based on pairings
Table 11: Performance model with the pure accounting rate of return and the
concentration ratios
(a) CF1i,t  is the dependent variable in each model.  It is the cash flow adjusted for depreciation, interest, taxes and changes
in provisions divided by the book values of equity and debt.  Country is the differential intercept, Country being set to one if
firm i is German.  Coldi,t and Cnewi,t are Herfindahl indexes of the voting equity held by the pre-IPO shareholders and the
post-IPO shareholders respectively.  Variable names marked with a D are the differential slope coefficients for German
firms.  (b) Models (1) and (3) are estimated using the size-matched sample.  Models (2) and (4) are estimated using the
industry-matched sample.  (c) Each model contains time dummies and industry dummies.  (d) m1 and m2 are test for the
absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals respectively.  These test statistics are asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  (e) The Sargan test statistic is a test of the over-identifying
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as c 2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of freedom reported in
parentheses.   (f) Model (3) is a linear system of first-differenced and levels equations.  The instruments are levels of CF1,
CF1_D, Cold, Cold_D, Cnew and Cnew_D dated t-2 / The instruments are levels of CF1, CF1_D, Lold, Lold_D, Lnew and
Lnew_D dated t-2 to t-3  for the differenced equations and first differences dated t-1 for the levels equations.  (g) P-values,
based on standard-errors asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses.
OLS in levels GMM(sys)

































































m1 -0.692 0.207 -4.408 -3.390
m2 0.915 -0.285 1.308 -0.347
Sargan test (d.f.) - - 65   (71) 60   (59)
Observations 340 399 263 30733
by market capitalisation and / or industry and may therefore be better at taking
account of different firm and industry characteristics.
5.1.3 A pairing analysis
There are two aims to this section.  The first one is to detect whether UK firms, which
are exposed to the market for corporate control, an external device for the correction
of management failure, perform better than German firms, which are not normally
exposed to the market for corporate control.  Adams (1994) suggests that even
German companies with a dispersed ownership are not exposed to the market for cor-
porate control, but are controlled by a complex system of cross-shareholdings set up
between Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Hypotheken-
und Wechsel-Bank, M￿nchener R￿ckversicherungs-AG, Allianz Holding and Bayer-
ische Vereinsbank.
This test differs from the first univariate tests (see sections 3.1 and 5.1.1) in the sense
that we match the German IPOs with UK IPOs of a similar size to obtain a first
sample and also match the German IPOs with UK IPOs operating in the same industry
to obtain a second sample.  It is also different from the first univariate test in the way
that we test whether capital markets characterised by different correction mechanisms
of managerial failure are also characterised by different levels of corporate
performance.
C4. As even German firms with a low concentration of ownership do not seem to be
exposed to the market for corporate control in the same way as UK firms, we
should expect that German firms perform worse than their UK counterparts.
Goergen (1997b) reports that some UK firms remain concentrated long time after the
flotation and are therefore similar to most German firms.  Therefore, the second aim
of this section is to determine whether widely held UK firms, the firms with the34
highest exposure to the market for corporate control, have a significantly higher
profitability than concentrated UK firms.
C5. In the UK, only widely held firms are exposed to the disciplining role of the
market for corporate control.  They should therefore perform significantly
better than concentrated UK firms.
5.1.3.1 Pairing German firms with UK firms
This section tests the validity of conjecture four.  It performs an additional test to the
univariate analysis of section 5.1.1 and the dynamic panel data analysis of section
5.1.2.  It tests the effect of the exposure to different mechanisms for the correction of
managerial failure on financial performance rather than the effect of different
ownership patterns on financial performance.
The German IPOs are matched by market capitalisation with UK IPOs to obtain a first
pairing and matched by industrial sector to obtain a second pairing (see Goergen
(1997b) for a detailed discussion of the matching criteria).  The advantage of this
analysis compared to the two previous types of univariate and multivariate tests is that
the present test controls for size or for industry in a more extensive way than the two
previous analyses which either ignored size and industry entirely (univariate tests) or
used aggregate industry groups (multivariate tests) rather than the two-digit groups
used here.
Table 12 contains the results from the pairing.  Panel A reports the differences in the
average performance between the German firms and the UK firms matched by market
capitalisation, whereas panel B reports the same differences for the sample matched
by industrial sector.35
As on average UK firms going public tend to be smaller than their German
counterparts (see Goergen (1997b)), the UK sample in panel A of table 12 comprises
a large number of firms with an above-average size.
Panel A indicates that German firms may have a slightly higher performance than UK
firms of a similar size.  This is true if we use the cumulative abnormal returns as a
measure of performance (both the parametric and the non-parametric test reject the
null hypothesis at the five per cent level), and is also true to some extent if we use the
cash flow divided by the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt
(at the five per cent level for the distribution-free test).
Table 12: Tests of significance of the differences between the means of
performance of German and UK samples matched by size or industry
(1) The German IPOs are paired in panel A with UK IPOs of a similar market capitalisation (in 1985 pounds sterling) and
paired in panel B with UK IPOs operating in the same industry.  (2) CF1 is the average over the seven years after the IPO of
the annual cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the book values of debt and
equity.  CF2 is the average of the same cash flow, but divided by the market value of equity and the book value of debt.  CAR
is the average annual cumulative abnormal return.  The cumulative abnormal returns were obtained by using a market model
with parameter values of b =1 and a =0 .  The market indices used are the FAZ Index for Germany and the FT-All Share
Index for the UK.  (3) ** Significant at the five per cent level for the two-tailed test.
Difference
between German
and UK mean (%)
t-statistic Wilcoxon signed-rank test
Panel A: Pairings matched by size
CF1  2.03   0.874 484 -296
CF2  2.08   1.747 486     -180**
CAR  7.18       2.152** 929     -449**
Panel B: Pairings matched by industry
CF1  0.64   0.364 537 -453
CF2  0.73   0.667 612 -379
CAR -1.34 -0.372 784 -869
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.36
The differences between means for the firms paired by industry (panel B of table 12)
are however not significantly different from zero at any sensible level of confidence.
This is true both for the parametric test and the non-parametric test.
To summarise, this test does not confirm conjecture four, i.e. that the generally higher
exposure of UK firms to the market for corporate control implies that UK firms have a
better financial profitability than German firms.
5.1.3.2 Pairing widely held UK firms with closely held UK firms
One should expect that closely held UK firms do not differ substantially from closely
held German firms in terms of their exposure to the market for corporate control.
However, if one argues that in the UK badly performing managers are generally
disciplined by the market for corporate control (rather than by a large shareholder as it
is supposed to be the case in Germany), one should expect that closely held UK firms,
given that they are not (or less) exposed to the prevailing system of managerial
correction, should perform less well than widely held UK firms.  In other words, this
is a test of conjecture five.
We use the same definition of a widely held firm as the one adopted in section 5.1.1.1.
We define all other firms as closely held firms.  We start with all the UK firms from
the two UK samples from Goergen (1997b).  The firms are this time matched both by
market capitalisation (in 1985 pounds sterling) and by industry.  For the matching by
size, the criterion was that the difference in market capitalisation between the larger
firm and the smaller firm over the market capitalisation of the larger firm should not
exceed 33.3 per cent.  The industry matching was done by matching each closely held
firm with a widely held firm in exactly the same two-digit group.  Seventeen firms
could be matched using these two matching criteria.
Table 13 shows the difference in means for the pairing as well as the test statistics for
the parametric test and the distribution-free test.  There is no significant difference in37
the means of UK firms with concentrated ownership and UK firms with widespread
ownership whatever the measure of performance.  None of the test statistics from the
parametric and non-parametric tests fall into the critical region of the rejection of the
null hypothesis.
We can therefore conclude that widely held UK firms do not perform significantly
better than closely held UK firms.  We reject conjecture five.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we tried to detect whether there is a relationship between current
performance and past ownership concentration.  We tested the validity of the
following five different conjectures.
Conjecture one states that as listed German and UK companies are characterised by
very different patterns of ownership, they should also be characterised by very
different levels of performance.  Our findings do not confirm this first conjecture.
Table 13: Tests of significance of the differences between the means of
performance of closely held UK firms and widely held UK firms
(1) The closely held UK firms are paired with widely held UK firms by market capitalisation (in 1985 pounds sterling) and by
industry (using the two-digit LSE classification).  (2) CF1 is the average over the seven-year period after the IPO of the
annual cash flow gross of depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the book values of debt and
equity.  CF2 is the average of the same cash flow, but normalised by the market value of equity and the book value of debt.
CAR is the average annual cumulative abnormal return.  The cumulative abnormal returns were obtained by using a market
model with parameter values of b =1 and a =0 .  The market indices used are the FAZ Index for Germany and the FT-All





t-statistic Wilcoxon signed-rank test
CF1 1.78  0.313 28 -38
CF2 0.32  0.131 22 -23
CAR -4.71 -0.662 50 -70
Source: IPO prospectuses, company reports, Datastream, Extel Financial, LSE microfiches,
LSPD and Saling.38
If conjecture two is true, firms that do not experience a change of control after the IPO
should have a worse financial performance than firms that become exposed to the
market of corporate control.  However, our results reject this second conjecture.
Using an event study, we checked whether significant reductions in shareholder
concentration cause significant changes in performance.  We had to reject the third
conjecture.
The evidence from the multivariate test also suggests that there is no relationship
between profitability and ownership.  Although it is evident for the German firms that
there is no relationship between performance and ownership, there seems to be a weak
relationship in 17 out of 48 estimations for the UK firms, a weak relationship which
was also found by Loderer and Martin (1996).  We believe that there is no genuine
relationship, as neither the magnitudes of the coefficients on the ownership variables
nor their signs are stable from specification to specification and from sample to
sample.  Even within the same sample, the sign of the coefficient on an ownership
variable is not necessarily stable.
Moreover, the validity of conjecture four, i.e. whether German firms underperform
compared to UK firms given the generally lower exposure of the former to the
disciplining function of the market for corporate control, was not confirmed by our
findings.
Finally, the profitability of closely held UK firms was compared with the profitability
of closely held UK firms of a similar market capitalisation and in the same industry
group.  The conjecture is that given that widely held UK corporations have a high
exposure to the market for corporate control, they should perform significantly better
than closely held UK firms that do not have a high exposure to the disciplining role of
the market for corporate control.  Again, the differences in means were not
significantly different from zero using both parametric and distribution-free tests and
conjecture five had to be rejected.39
All these various analyses, both univariate and multivariate suggest that the financial
performance of firms does not depend on their ownership patterns.  As the findings
from Goergen (1997b) suggest, ownership is determined by the characteristics of the
firm.  We can therefore conclude with Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that ownership of a
firm is normally chosen in a way to maximise a firm’s value.  Our results confirm the
results found by Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Bergstr￿m and Rydqvist (1990),
Denis and Denis (1994), Kole (1996) and Loderer and Martin (1996) who also found
no evidence that larger stock holdings lead either to a better performance or to the
expropriation of minority shareholders.40
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